



# On the Effectiveness of Mission-time Linear Temporal Logic (MLTL) in AI Applications




Kristin Yvonne Rozier  
Iowa State University of Science and Technology  
March 28, 2023

## AAC Operational Concept<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup>H Erzberger, K Heere. "Algorithm and operational concept for resolving short-range conflicts." Proc. IMechE G J. Aerosp. Eng. 224 (2) (2010) 225–243.

## AAC Operational Concept<sup>2</sup>



## LTL Model Checking triggered system design changes<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Y. Zhao and K.Y. Rozier. "Formal Specification and Verification of a Coordination Protocol for an Automated Air Traffic Control System." SCP Journal, vol-96, no-3, pg 337-353, 2014.

<sup>2</sup>H Erzberger, K Heere. "Algorithm and operational concept for resolving short-range conflicts." Proc. IMechE G J. Aerosp. Eng. 224 (2) (2010) 225–243.

## Is LTL All We Need?

ATC never turns off . . .

## Is LTL All We Need?

## ATC never turns off ... LTL intuitively describes it

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Aircraft have finite missions; ATC has finite modes. . .

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ATC never turns off ...  
LTL intuitively describes it

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LTLf?

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Aircraft have finite missions; ATC has finite modes...  
LTLf?

But there are numerical bounds on the timelines. . .

## Is LTL All We Need?

ATC never turns off ...  
LTL intuitively describes it

Aircraft have finite missions; ATC has finite modes...  
LTLf?

But there are numerical bounds on the timelines...  
MTL? STL?

# MTL: Many Variations<sup>3</sup>

- **Semantics:** continuous vs pointwise
- **Traces:** finite vs infinite
- **Intervals:**
  - infinite vs finite vs bounded (specific bounds)
  - open, closed, half-open
  - punctual (singleton allowed) or not
  - start with 0 or end with  $\infty$ :  $MTL_0$ ;  $MTL_{0,\infty}$
- **Interval types:** integer vs real numbers

---

<sup>3</sup> Ouaknine & Worrell. "Some Recent Results in Metric Temporal Logic." FORMATS 2008.

## STL: Made for Describing CPS<sup>5</sup>

STL adds an **analog layer** to MTL,  
reasons over **real-valued predicates** with **real-time intervals**<sup>4</sup>

**STL Semantics:** the satisfaction of an STL formula  $\varphi$  by a signal  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  at time  $t$  is

$$(x, t) \models \mu \Leftrightarrow f(x_1[t], \dots, x_n[t]) > 0$$

$$(x, t) \models \varphi \wedge \psi \Leftrightarrow (x, t) \models \varphi \wedge (x, t) \models \psi$$

$$(x, t) \models \neg \varphi \Leftrightarrow \neg((x, t) \models \varphi)$$

$$(x, t) \models \varphi \mathcal{U}_{[a, b]} \psi \Leftrightarrow \exists t' \in [t + a, t + b] \text{ such that } (x, t') \models \psi$$

$$\wedge \forall t'' \in [t, t'], (x, t'') \models \psi$$


<sup>4</sup> Donzé. "On Signal Temporal Logic." RV, 2013

<sup>5</sup> Maler & Nickovic. "Monitoring Temporal Properties of Continuous Signals." FORMATS 2004


# STL: With Great Power Comes...

- **Complexity**: MTL satisfiability and model checking are **undecidable**; STL?
- **Confusion**: LTL is hard to write correctly, validate; STL?
- **Precision**: STL needs details not present in the system

## AAC Operational Concept



## AAC Operational Concept



**Times are discrete, rough estimates...**

# STL: Not a Good Fit

- Humans have to write the specifications; **writing formal properties is hard.**<sup>6</sup>
- Humans have to **validate** the specifications; need to check satisfiability efficiently
- Certification requires **explainability**
- Many domains (ISS) require **adaptability**

---

<sup>6</sup> K. Y. Rozier. "Specification: The Biggest Bottleneck in Formal Methods and Autonomy." *VSTTE Keynote 2016*.  

# STL continued . . .

- Requires or assumes details not present in the system
- Continuous-time reasoning might not match up with discrete systems
- “Preciseness” → ↑ complexity; won’t fit in tight spaces
- Formulas are too specific; not re-usable
- Hard to validate (hard for humans to understand)
- Specifications not robust to realistic system changes

# MLTL: A Good Specification Language<sup>7</sup>


**Mission-Time Temporal Logic** (MLTL) reasons about *integer-bounded* timelines:

- finite set of atomic propositions  $\{p \ q\}$
- Boolean connectives:  $\neg$ ,  $\wedge$ ,  $\vee$ , and  $\rightarrow$
- temporal connectives *with time bounds*:

Symbol	Operator	Timeline
$\Box_{[2,6]} p$	ALWAYS <sub>[2,6]</sub>	
$\Diamond_{[0,7]} p$	EVENTUALLY <sub>[0,7]</sub>	
$p \mathcal{U}_{[1,5]} q$	UNTIL <sub>[1,5]</sub>	
$p \mathcal{R}_{[3,8]} q$	RELEASE <sub>[3,8]</sub>	


<sup>7</sup> T. Reinbacher, K.Y. Rozier, J. Schumann. "Temporal-Logic Based Runtime Observer Pairs for System Health Management of Real-Time Systems." TACAS 2014.

# Runtime Monitoring for the Swift UAS



After receiving a command (cmd) for takeoff, the Swift UAS must reach an altitude of 600ft within 40 seconds.


# Runtime Monitoring for the Swift UAS



After receiving a command (cmd) for takeoff, the Swift UAS must reach an altitude of 600ft within 40 seconds.

$$(\text{cmd} == \text{takeoff}) \rightarrow \Diamond_{[0,40]} (\text{alt} \geq 600 \text{ ft})$$

# R2U2 Observation Tree (Specification)<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup>

Rozier & Schumann. "R2U2: Tool Overview." In *International Workshop on Competitions, Usability, Benchmarks, Evaluation, and Standardisation for Runtime Verification Tools (RV-CUBES), 2017.*

# MLTL: Not MTL-over-naturals<sup>9</sup>

## Some important differences:

- Finite traces
- Finite intervals
- **U-semantics:**  $\pi \models \varphi \mathcal{U}_{[a,b]} \psi$  iff  $|\pi| > a$  and,  $\exists i \in [a, b], i < |\pi|$  such that  $\pi, i \models \psi$  and  $\forall j \in [a, b], j < i$  it holds that  $\pi, j \models \varphi$
- Intervals are closed, unit-less (generic)
- Signal processing compartmentalized

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<sup>9</sup> Li, Vardi, Rozier. "Satisfiability checking for mission-time LTL." CAV, 2019. 

# Satisfying Requirements

**R**ESPONSIVE  
**R**EALIZABLE  
**U**NOBTRUSIVE  
**U**nit

**R2U2**




R2U2: REALIZABLE, RESPONSIVE, UNOBTRUSIVE<sup>10</sup>

- ① **Signal Processing**: Preparation of sensor readings
- ② **Temporal Logic (TL) Observers**: Efficient temporal reasoning
  - ① **Asynchronous**: output  $\langle t, \{0, 1\} \rangle$
  - ② **Synchronous**: output  $\langle t, \{0, 1, ?\} \rangle$
  - **Logics**: Mission-time LTL (MLTL) (plus pt-MLTL, set-wise reasoning)
- ③ **Bayes Nets**: Efficient decision making
  - **Output**: most-likely status + probability

---

<sup>10</sup> Kristin Yvonne Rozier, and Johann Schumann. "R2U2: Tool Overview." In International Workshop on Competitions, Usability, Benchmarks, Evaluation, and Standardisation for Runtime Verification Tools (RV-CUBES), held in conjunction with the 17th International Conference on Runtime Verification (RV), Kalpa Publications, Seattle, Washington, USA, September 13-16, 2017.


## Adding UAS into the NAS: A UTM First Step<sup>11</sup>




<sup>11</sup> Hammer, Cauwels, Hertz, Jones, Rozier. "Integrating runtime verification into an automated UAS traffic management system." *Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering*, 2021

# Monitoring and Diagnosis of Security Threats<sup>12</sup>



**Threat detection:** *attack monitoring*, *post-attack system behavior monitoring*, and *diagnosis*.



# Multi-Platform, Multi-Architecture Runtime Verification of Autonomous Space Systems



# Multi-Platform, Multi-Architecture Runtime Verification of Autonomous Space Systems




[https://temporallogic.org/research/R2U2/FORMATS\\_18\\_teaser\\_BrianKempa.mp4](https://temporallogic.org/research/R2U2/FORMATS_18_teaser_BrianKempa.mp4)


# Robonaut2



## Robonaut2's Knee




# Robonaut2's Knee





[http://temporallogic.org/research/R2U2/R2U2-on-R2\\_demo.mp4](http://temporallogic.org/research/R2U2/R2U2-on-R2_demo.mp4)

# Resource Estimation and Improved Encoding Algorithms<sup>13</sup>



<sup>13</sup> B.Kempa, P.Zhang, P.H.Jones, J.Zambreno, K.Y.Rozier. "Embedding Online Runtime Verification for Fault Disambiguation on Robonaut2." FORMATS, LNCS vol 12288, 2020.

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# Cyclone Sounding Rocket!

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p6dwT0sTdH0&t=158s>

## Flight-Certification == Proofs that Fly! 14 15 16 17




14 Hariharan, Kempa, Wongpiromsarn, Jones, Rozier. "MLTL Multi-type (MLTLM): A Logic for Reasoning about Signals of Different Types." NSV 2022.


15 Luppen, Jacks, Baughman, Hertz, Cutler, Lee, Rozier. "Elucidation and Analysis of Specification Patterns in Aerospace System Telemetry." NFM 2022.

16 Hertz, Luppen, Rozier. "Integrating Runtime Verification into a Sounding Rocket Control System." NFM 2021.


17 Hammer, Cauwels, Hertz, Jones, Rozier. "Integrating Runtime Verification into an Automated UAS Traffic Management System." *Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering: A NASA Journal* 2021.



# NASA Lunar Gateway Vehicle System Manager V&V



## NASA Lunar Gateway Vehicle System Manager V&amp;V


$$(CMD = START) \rightarrow (\Diamond_{[0,5]}(ActionHappens \ \& \ \Diamond_{[0,2]}(CMD = END)))$$

# NASA Lunar Gateway V&V Using MLTL



Adding a Verification View for an Autonomous Real-Time System Architecture

James B. Dabney, Julia M. Badger, Pavan Rajagopal

AIAA 2021-0566; SE-05:Systems Engineering V, 12 January 2021

<https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2021-0566>

Video: <https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2021-0566.vid>



FSW 2021: Using Assume-Guarantee Contracts In Autonomous Spacecraft - James Bruster Dabney


<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zrtyiyNf674>



FSW 2022: Using Assume-Guarantee Contracts for Developmental Verification of Autonomous Spacecraft

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HFnn6Tzb1Pg>

# MLTL Multi-type (MLTLM): A Logic for Reasoning About Signals of Different Types<sup>19</sup>



The spacecraft **maintenance cycle** runs at least **once a month** over the **five-year mission**.

Monthly course corrections **never** involve burning the **thrusters** more than 3 seconds at a time.

$$\square_{[0,5,\text{year}]} [(\Diamond_{[0,30,\text{day}]} \text{maintenance}) \wedge (\neg \square_{[0,3,\text{sec}]} \text{thrusters})]^{18}$$

<sup>18</sup> Formula simplified for illustration.

<sup>19</sup> Hariharan, Kempa, Wongpiromsarn, Jones, Rozier, NSV 2022

# MLTL is Unusually Effective!

- Easier to **accurately represent timing constraints** of real systems (e.g., ATC bounds)
- Easier to **validate** (matches real system better)
- Low **complexity/memory** to check
- **Generic, reusable** specifications are robust to hardware substitutions/clock changes
  - Can **tune timescales** for resource trade offs on embedded systems
- **Separation of concerns** (Boolean testers, temporal logic, intervals)
  - Allows **re-use of processed signals** outside of logic
  - Retain **validation/complexity/size benefits** while separating out extensions
- **Fits into business processes for real CPS development**

# Future Directions: Make MLTL Even More Effective!

- MLTL **model checking**
- MLTL → **automata**
- Better MLTL **satisfiability checking**
- MLTL **synthesis**
- MLTL **planning?**
- Better MLTL **elicitation** and **validation**
- MLTL **explainability**