



# On the Effectiveness of Mission-time Linear Temporal Logic (MLTL) in AI Applications




Kristin Yvonne Rozier  
Iowa State University of Science and Technology  
March 28, 2023

# AAC Operational Concept<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup> H Erzberger, K Heere. "Algorithm and operational concept for resolving short-range conflicts." Proc. IMechE G J. Aerosp. Eng. 224 (2) (2010) 225–243.

# AAC Operational Concept<sup>2</sup>



LTL Model Checking triggered system design changes<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Y. Zhao and K.Y. Rozier. "Formal Specification and Verification of a Coordination Protocol for an Automated Air Traffic Control System." SCP Journal, vol-96, no-3, pg 337-353, 2014.

<sup>2</sup>H Erzberger, K Heere. "Algorithm and operational concept for resolving short-range conflicts." Proc. IMechE G J. Aerosp. Eng. 224 (2) (2010) 225–243.

# Is LTL All We Need?

ATC never turns off ...



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Aircraft have finite missions; ATC has finite modes...

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But there are numerical bounds on the timelines...

# Is LTL All We Need?

ATC never turns off ...

LTL intuitively describes it

Aircraft have finite missions; ATC has finite modes...

LTLf?

But there are numerical bounds on the timelines...

MTL? STL?

## MTL: Many Variations<sup>3</sup>

- **Semantics:** continuous vs pointwise
- **Traces:** finite vs infinite
- **Intervals:**
  - infinite vs finite vs bounded (specific bounds)
  - open, closed, half-open
  - punctual (singleton allowed) or not
  - start with 0 or end with  $\infty$ :  $MTL_0$ ;  $MTL_{0,\infty}$
- **Interval types:** integer vs real numbers

<sup>3</sup> Ouaknine & Worrell. "Some Recent Results in Metric Temporal Logic." FORMATS 2008.

# STL: Made for Describing CPS<sup>5</sup>

STL adds an **analog layer** to MTL,  
reasons over **real-valued predicates** with **real-time intervals**<sup>4</sup>

**STL Semantics:** the satisfaction of an STL formula  $\varphi$  by a signal  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$  at time  $t$  is

$$(x, t) \models \mu \Leftrightarrow f(x_1[t], \dots, x_n[t]) > 0$$

$$(x, t) \models \varphi \wedge \psi \Leftrightarrow (x, t) \models \varphi \wedge (x, t) \models \psi$$

$$(x, t) \models \neg\varphi \Leftrightarrow \neg((x, t) \models \varphi)$$

$$(x, t) \models \varphi \mathcal{U}_{[a,b]} \psi \Leftrightarrow \exists t' \in [t + a, t + b] \text{ such that } (x, t') \models \psi \\ \wedge \forall t'' \in [t, t'], (x, t'') \models \varphi$$

<sup>4</sup> Donzè. "On Signal Temporal Logic." RV, 2013.


<sup>5</sup> Maler & Nickovic. "Monitoring Temporal Properties of Continuous Signals." FORMATS 2004.

# STL: With Great Power Comes...


- **Complexity**: MTL satisfiability and model checking are **undecidable**; STL?
- **Confusion**: LTL is hard to write correctly, validate; STL?
- **Precision**: STL needs details not present in the system



# AAC Operational Concept



# AAC Operational Concept



**Times are discrete, rough estimates...**

# STL: Not a Good Fit

- Humans have to write the specifications; **writing formal properties is hard.**<sup>6</sup>
- Humans have to **validate** the specifications; need to check satisfiability efficiently
- Certification requires **explainability**
- Many domains (ISS) require **adaptability**

---

<sup>6</sup> K. Y. Rozier. "Specification: The Biggest Bottleneck in Formal Methods and Autonomy." VSTTE Keynote, 2016. 🔍 ↻

# STL continued ...

- Requires or assumes details not present in the system
- Continuous-time reasoning might not match up with discrete systems
- “Preciseness”  $\rightarrow \uparrow$  complexity; won’t fit in tight spaces
- Formulas are too specific; not re-usable
- Hard to validate (hard for humans to understand)
- Specifications not robust to realistic system changes

# MLTL: A Good Specification Language<sup>7</sup>


**Mission-Time Temporal Logic (MLTL)** reasons about *integer-bounded* timelines:

- finite set of atomic propositions  $\{p, q\}$
- Boolean connectives:  $\neg$ ,  $\wedge$ ,  $\vee$ , and  $\rightarrow$
- temporal connectives *with time bounds*:

Symbol	Operator	Timeline
$\square_{[2,6]} p$	ALWAYS <sub>[2,6]</sub>	
$\diamond_{[0,7]} p$	EVENTUALLY <sub>[0,7]</sub>	
$p\mathcal{U}_{[1,5]} q$	UNTIL <sub>[1,5]</sub>	
$p\mathcal{R}_{[3,8]} q$	RELEASE <sub>[3,8]</sub>	


<sup>7</sup>T. Reinbacher, K.Y. Rozier, J. Schumann. "Temporal-Logic Based Runtime Observer Pairs for System Health Management of Real-Time Systems." TACAS 2014.

# Runtime Monitoring for the Swift UAS



After receiving a command (cmd) for takeoff, the Swift UAS must reach an altitude of 600ft within 40 seconds.

# Runtime Monitoring for the Swift UAS




After receiving a command (*cmd*) for takeoff, the Swift UAS must reach an altitude of 600ft within 40 seconds.

$$(cmd == takeoff) \rightarrow \Diamond_{[0,40]}(alt \geq 600 \text{ ft})$$

# R2U2 Observation Tree (Specification)<sup>8</sup>

Health Nodes / Failure Modes	
H_FG	<b>Magnetometer sensor</b>
H_FC_RxUR	Receiver underrun
H_FC_RxOVR	Receiver overrun
H_FG_TxOVR	<b>Transmitter overrun in sensor</b>
H_FG_TxErr	Transmitter error in in sensor



<sup>8</sup> Rozier & Schumann. "R2U2: Tool Overview." In *International Workshop on Competitions, Usability, Benchmarks, Evaluation, and Standardisation for Runtime Verification Tools (RV-CUBES)*, 2017.



# MLTL: Not MTL-over-naturals<sup>9</sup>

## Some important differences:

- Finite traces
- Finite intervals
- **U-semantics:**  $\pi \models \varphi \mathcal{U}_{[a,b]} \psi$  iff  $|\pi| > a$  and,  $\exists i \in [a, b], i < |\pi|$  such that  $\pi, i \models \psi$  and  $\forall j \in [a, b], j < i$  it holds that  $\pi, j \models \varphi$
- Intervals are closed, unit-less (generic)
- Signal processing compartmentalized

<sup>9</sup>Li, Vardi, Rozier. "Satisfiability checking for mission-time LTL." CAV, 2019.

# Satisfying Requirements

**R**ESPONSIVE  
**R**EALIZABLE  
**U**NOBTRUSIVE  
**U**nit  
  
**R2U2**




# R2U2: REALIZABLE, RESPONSIVE, UNOBTUSIVE<sup>10</sup>

- ① **Signal Processing:** Preparation of sensor readings
- ② **Temporal Logic (TL) Observers:** Efficient temporal reasoning
  - ① **Asynchronous:** output  $\langle t, \{0, 1\} \rangle$
  - ② **Synchronous:** output  $\langle t, \{0, 1, ?\} \rangle$ 
    - **Logics:** Mission-time LTL (MLTL) (plus pt-MLTL, set-wise reasoning)
- ③ **Bayes Nets:** Efficient decision making
  - **Output:** most-likely status + probability

<sup>10</sup> Kristin Yvonne Rozier, and Johann Schumann. "R2U2: Tool Overview." In International Workshop on Competitions, Usability, Benchmarks, Evaluation, and Standardisation for Runtime Verification Tools (RV-CUBES), held in conjunction with the 17th International Conference on Runtime Verification (RV), Kalpa Publications, Seattle, Washington, USA, September 13-16, 2017.


# Adding UAS into the NAS: A UTM First Step<sup>11</sup>



<sup>11</sup> Hammer, Cauwels, Hertz, Jones, Rozier. "Integrating runtime verification into an automated UAS traffic management system." *Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering*, 2021


# Monitoring and Diagnosis of Security Threats<sup>12</sup>

**Threat detection:** *attack monitoring*, *post-attack system behavior monitoring*, and *diagnosis*.





<sup>12</sup> Johann Schumann, Patrick Moosbrugger, Kristin Y. Rozier. "R2U2: Monitoring and Diagnosis of Security Threats for Unmanned Aerial Systems." In *Runtime Verification (RV15)*, Springer-Verlag, September, 2015.

# Multi-Platform, Multi-Architecture Runtime Verification of Autonomous Space Systems



# Multi-Platform, Multi-Architecture Runtime Verification of Autonomous Space Systems




[https://temporallogic.org/research/R2U2/FORMATS\\_18\\_teaser\\_BrianKempa.mp4](https://temporallogic.org/research/R2U2/FORMATS_18_teaser_BrianKempa.mp4)




# Robonaut2



# Robonaut2's Knee




# Robonaut2's Knee





[http://temporallogic.org/research/R2U2/R2U2-on-R2\\_demo.mp4](http://temporallogic.org/research/R2U2/R2U2-on-R2_demo.mp4)

# Resource Estimation and Improved Encoding Algorithms <sup>13</sup>



<sup>13</sup> B.Kempa, P.Zhang, P.H.Jones, J.Zambreno, K.Y.Rozier. "Embedding Online Runtime Verification for Fault Disambiguation on Robonaut2." FORMATS, LNCS vol 12288, 2020.

# Resource Estimation and Improved Encoding Algorithms <sup>13</sup>




<sup>13</sup> B.Kempa, P.Zhang, P.H.Jones, J.Zambreno, K.Y.Rozier. "Embedding Online Runtime Verification for Fault Disambiguation on Robonaut2." FORMATS, LNCS vol 12288, 2020.

# Cyclone Sounding Rocket!

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p6dwT0sTdH0&t=158s>


# Flight-Certification == Proofs that Fly! 14 15 16 17




- <sup>14</sup> Hariharan, Kempa, Wongpiromsarn, Jones, Rozier. "MLTL Multi-type (MLTLM): A Logic for Reasoning about Signals of Different Types." NSV 2022.
- <sup>15</sup> Luppen, Jacks, Baughman, Hertz, Cutler, Lee, Rozier. "Elucidation and Analysis of Specification Patterns in Aerospace System Telemetry." NFM 2022.
- <sup>16</sup> Hertz, Luppen, Rozier. "Integrating Runtime Verification into a Sounding Rocket Control System." NFM 2021.
- <sup>17</sup> Hammer, Cauwels, Hertz, Jones, Rozier. "Integrating Runtime Verification into an Automated UAS Traffic Management System." *Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering: A NASA Journal* 2021.



# NASA Lunar Gateway Vehicle System Manager V&V



# NASA Lunar Gateway Vehicle System Manager V&V



$(CMD = START) \rightarrow (\Diamond_{[0,5]}(ActionHappens \ \& \ \Diamond_{[0,2]}(CMD = END)))$

# NASA Lunar Gateway V&V Using MLTL



## Adding a Verification View for an Autonomous Real-Time System Architecture

James B. Dabney, Julia M. Badger, Pavan Rajagopal

AIAA 2021-0566; SE-05:Systems Engineering V, 12 January 2021

<https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2021-0566>

Video: <https://doi.org/10.2514/6.2021-0566.vid>



## FSW 2021: Using Assume-Guarantee Contracts In Autonomous Spacecraft - James Bruster Dabney


<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zrtyiyNf674>



## FSW 2022: Using Assume-Guarantee Contracts for Developmental Verification of Autonomous Spacecraft

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HFnn6TzblPg>

# MLTL Multi-type (MLTLM): A Logic for Reasoning About Signals of Different Types<sup>19</sup>



The spacecraft **maintenance cycle** runs at least **once a month** over the **five-year mission**.

Monthly course corrections **never** involve burning the **thrusters more than 3 seconds** at a time.

$$\Box_{[0,5,\text{year}]}[(\Diamond_{[0,30,\text{day}]} \text{maintenance}) \wedge (\neg \Box_{[0,3,\text{sec}]} \text{thrusters})]^{18}$$

<sup>18</sup> Formula simplified for illustration.

<sup>19</sup> Hariharan, Kempa, Wongpiromsarn, Jones, Rozier, NSV 2022

# MLTL is Unusually Effective!

- Easier to **accurately represent timing constraints** of real systems (e.g., ATC bounds)
- Easier to **validate** (matches real system better)
- Low **complexity/memory** to check
- **Generic, reusable** specifications are robust to hardware substitutions/clock changes
  - Can **tune timescales** for resource trade offs on embedded systems
- **Separation of concerns** (Boolean testers, temporal logic, intervals)
  - Allows **re-use of processed signals** outside of logic
  - Retain **validation/complexity/size benefits** while separating out extensions
- **Fits into business processes for real CPS development**

# Future Directions: Make MLTL Even More Effective!

- MLTL **model checking**
- MLTL → **automata**
- Better MLTL **satisfiability checking**
- MLTL **synthesis**
- MLTL **planning?**
- Better MLTL **elicitation** and **validation**
- MLTL **explainability**