

R2U2: Runtime Verification Takes Off!

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VORTEX 2024




September 19, 2024

How is Flight Software




How is **Flight Software** Different from **Software**?




How is **Flight Software** Different from **Software**?

- **Has to work**



How is **Flight Software** Different from **Software**?

- **Has to work**
- Need capabilities for **independent checks**



How is **Flight Software** Different from **Software**?

- **Has to** work
- Need capabilities for **independent checks**
- Need **transparent** ties to **verification** tasks



Satisfying Requirements



Satisfying Requirements

RESPONSIVE
REALIZABLE
UNOBTRUSIVE
Unit

R2U2



Runtime Monitoring On-Board

Adding currently available runtime monitoring capabilities to the UAS would change its flight certification.

“Losing flight certification is like moving over to the dark side: once you go there you can never come back.”

— Doug McKinnon,
NASA Ames’ UAS Crew Chief



Requirements

REALIZABILITY:

- easy, *expressive* specification language
- *generic* interface to connect to a wide variety of systems
- *adaptable* to missions, mission stages, platforms



RESPONSIVENESS:

- *continuously monitor* the system
- *detect deviations* in *real time*
- *enable mitigation* or rescue measures

UNOBTRUSIVENESS:



- *functionality*: not change behavior
- *certifiability*: avoid re-certification of flight software/hardware
- *timing*: not interfere with timing guarantees
- *tolerances*: obey size, weight, power, telemetry bandwidth constraints
- *cost*: use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components

Runtime Observers for the Swift UAS



Whenever the Swift UAS is in the air, its indicated airspeed (V_{IAS}) must be greater than its stall speed V_S . The UAS is considered to be air-bound when its altitude alt is larger than that of the runway alt_0 .

Runtime Observers for the Swift UAS







Whenever the Swift UAS is in the air, its indicated airspeed (V_{IAS}) must be greater than its stall speed V_S . The UAS is considered to be air-bound when its altitude alt is larger than that of the runway alt_0 .

ALWAYS((alt > alt₀) \rightarrow (V_{IAS} > V_S))

Encoding Timelines: Mission-time Linear Temporal Logic


Mission-time LTL (MLTL) reasons about *bounded* timelines:

- finite set of atomic propositions $\{p, q\}$
- Boolean connectives: $\neg, \wedge, \vee, \text{ and } \rightarrow$
- temporal connectives *with time bounds*:

Symbol	Operator	Timeline
$\Box_{[2,6]} p$	ALWAYS _[2,6]	
$\Diamond_{[0,7]} p$	EVENTUALLY _[0,7]	
$p \mathcal{U}_{[1,5]} q$	UNTIL _[1,5]	
$p \mathcal{R}_{[3,8]} q$	RELEASE _[3,8]	


Asynchronous Observers (aka event-triggered)¹

- *evaluate with every new input*
- 2-valued output: {**true**; **false**}
- resolve **verdict as early as possible** (a priori known time)
- for each clock tick, may resolve **verdict** for clock ticks prior to the current time n if the information required for this resolution was not available until n




¹ Thomas Reinbacher, Kristin Y. Rozier, and Johann Schumann. "Temporal-Logic Based Runtime Observer Pairs for System Health Management of Real-Time Systems." In *Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS)*, volume 8413 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS)*, pages 357–372, Springer-Verlag, April 2014. 

R2U2 High-Level Architecture²




² Rozier, Kristin Y., and Johann Schumann. "R2U2: tool overview." (2017)

Asynchronous Observers Example



0	(false ,0)	8	(true ,3)
1	(false ,1)	9	(true ,4)
2	(false ,2)	10	(true ,5)
3	(\perp , \perp)	11	(false ,11) Resynchronized!
4	(\perp , \perp)	12	(false ,12)
5	(\perp , \perp)	13	(\perp , \perp)
6	(\perp , \perp)	14	(false ,14) Resynchronized!
7	(\perp , \perp)	15	(\perp , \perp)


FPGA Implementation of Temporal Observers³



- asynchronous observers: substantial hardware complexity
- synchronous observers: small HW footprint


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Hard- and Software Architecture: Resource Estimation



- How do we fit in the resources left over?
- Choose between 3 R2U2 implementations:
 - Hardware: FPGA
 - Software: C emulation of FPGA
 - Software: Object-oriented C++

Hard- and Software Architecture: Resource Estimation



- How do we fit in the resources left over?
- Choose between 3 R2U2 implementations:
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1 C2PO Input

INPUT
a0,a1,a2: bool;
b0,b1,b2: bool;

DEFINE
c = a1 || a2;

SPEC
s0: a0;
s1: c;
s2: b0 U[0,5] b1;
s3: G[1,3] b2;
s4: s2 && s3;

uint8_t
float
Common Subexpression Elimination
Booleanizer
Extended Operators
COMPILE
Compile status: ok
C2PO Log

2 Software Configuration

Clock Frequency (GHz)
10 **7**

CPU Operator Latencies

Worst-case Exec. Time
18.00000 μ s/ 0.05556MHz

Est. SCQ Memory
0.0703125KB

3 Hardware Configuration

Clock Frequency (MHz)
100 **8**

LUT Type Select
LUT-3

Resource to Observe
LUT

Timestamp Length (Bits)
32

Comparators per Node
33

Adders per Node
32

FPGA Operator Latencies

Worst-case Exec. Time
4.30000 μ s/ 0.23256MHz

Total SCQ Memory Slots
18

4 AST visualization

AST Node Data: a0, a2, a1, b0, b1, b2, U[0,5], G[1,3], &&, ==

5 Mouseover Data

Expression: (b0)U[0,5](b1)
Node: U[0,5]
BPD: 0
WPD: 5
SCQ size: 4

6 Assembly

TL: n0: load s0
TL: n1: end n0 f0
TL: n2: load s1
TL: n3: load s2
TL: n4: or n2 n3
TL: n5: end n4 f1
TL: n6: load s3
TL: n7: load s4
TL: n8: until n6 n7 0
TL: n9: end n8 f2
TL: n10: load s5
TL: n11: global n10 1
TL: n12: end n11 f0

7 LUT Requirements

8 FPGA design size vs maximum timestamp value.

9 Number of LUTs vs Timestamp Width (Bits)

Figure: R2U2 Configuration Explorer web application: 1) C2PO specification input; 2) C2PO options; 3) C2PO output; 4) AST visualization; 5) AST node data; 6) R2U2 instruction; 7) C engine speed and memory calculator; 8) FPGA speed and size calculator; 9) FPGA design size vs maximum timestamp value.

Lifting Runtime Monitoring

Runtime Monitoring

⁵Ylies Falcone, Srdan Krstic, Giles Reger, and Dmitriy Traytel. "A taxonomy for classifying runtime verification tools." In International Conference on Runtime Verification, pp. 241-262. Springer, Cham, 2018.

Lifting Runtime Monitoring

Temporal Fault Disambiguation



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
Temporal Fault Disambiguation



Runtime Monitoring

“R2U2 breaks our taxonomy; it is entirely application driven.”
— Giles Reger, 11/13/2018⁵

R2U2 Observation Tree (Specification)





⁶ Kristin Yvonne Rozier, and Johann Schumann. "R2U2: Tool Overview." In *International Workshop on Competitions, Usability, Benchmarks, Evaluation, and Standardisation for Runtime Verification Tools (RV-CUBES)*, held in conjunction with the 17th International Conference on Runtime Verification (RV 2017), Springer-Verlag, Seattle, Washington, USA, September 13–16, 2017.

Adding UAS into the NAS?⁷

⁷

Matthew Cauwels, Abigail Hammer, Benjamin Hertz, Phillip Jones, and Kristin Yvonne Rozier. "Integrating Runtime Verification into an Automated UAS Traffic Management System." *DETECT 2020*

Robonaut2's Knee⁸






⁸ Kempa, Brian, Pei Zhang, Phillip H. Jones, Joseph Zambreno, and Kristin Yvonne Rozier. "Embedding online runtime verification for fault disambiguation on Robonaut2." *FORMATS 2020*.

Robonaut2



http://temporallogic.org/research/R2U2/R2U2-on-R2_demo.mp4


Cyclone Rocketry's Sounding Rocket⁹



Left: Rocket mission states: *Launch Pad* (0), *Boost* (1), *Coast* (2), *Descent* (3). Right Top: Model of *Nova Somnium*'s ACS, Right Bottom: the physical ACS.

⁹ B. Hertz, Z. Luppen, K.Y. Rozier. "Integrating Runtime Verification into a Sounding Rocket Control System." *NASA Formal Methods Symposium (NFM)*, 2021.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p6dwT0sTdH0>

NASA Lunar Gateway: Assume-Guarantee Contracts¹⁰
$$(CMD == START) \rightarrow (\square_{[0,5]}(ActionHappens \& \square_{[0,2]}(CMD = END)))$$

¹⁰ Dabney, James B., Julia M. Badger, and Pavan Rajagopal. "Adding a Verification View for an Autonomous Real-Time System Architecture." In AIAA Scitech 2021 Forum, p. 0566. 2021.

Domain-Driven Adaptations

“Every file that gets opened eventually gets closed.”

¹¹ C. Johannsen, B. Kempa, P. H. Jones, K. Y. Rozier, T. Wongpiromsarn. “Impossible Made Possible: Encoding Intractable Specifications via Implied Domain Constraints.” FMICS, 2023.



Domain-Driven Adaptations

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
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Need a Configuration Compiler for Property Organization (C2PO)

11

¹¹ C. Johannsen, B. Kempa, P. H. Jones, K. Y. Rozier, T. Wongpiromsarn. “Impossible Made Possible: Encoding Intractable Specifications via Implied Domain Constraints.” FMICS, 2023.






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¹² C. Johannsen, P. H. Jones, B. Kempa, K. Y. Rozier, P. Zhang. "R2U2 Version 3.0: Re-imagining a Toolchain for Specification, Resource Estimation, and Optimized Observer Generation for Runtime Verification in Hardware and Software." CAV, 2023.


¹³ C. Johannsen, B. Kempa, P. H. Jones, K. Y. Rozier, T. Wongpiromsarn. "Impossible Made Possible: Encoding Intractable Specifications via Implied Domain Constraints." FMICS, 2023.

Isabelle Theorem Proving



R2U2: Realizable Responsive Unobtrusive Unit

- **Data Integrity**: data is consistent, coherent, within expectations
- **Sanity Checking**: common-sense assumptions hold
- **Fault Mitigation**: real-time monitoring for fault signatures
- **Security Monitoring**: complex temporal patterns indicative of breaches
- **Mission Integration**: automatically catch mis-configured, or otherwise tenuous/faulty connections that elude system integration checks




<http://r2u2.temporallogic.org/>

BACKUP SLIDES

Runtime Functional Specification Patterns¹⁴

- **Rates**
- **Ranges**
- **Relationships**
- **Control Sequences**
- **Consistency Checks**




¹⁴

K.Y.Rozier. "Specification: The Biggest Bottleneck in Formal Methods and Autonomy" VSTTE, 2016

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


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


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


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